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Missing the outbreak for the germs:
Institutionalized non-knowledge and industrial
power in agrofood safety governance
Patrick F. Baur1,*
Leafy greens cause a growing proportion of foodborne illness outbreaks despite heavy investment in
surveillance technologies designed to control pathogenic hazards in agriculture. To understand how the
governing regime maintains authority despite continual lapses in control, I examine a deadly 2018 outbreak
of Escherichia coli O157: H7 linked to romaine lettuce. By comparing the outbreak investigation and
regulatory response to the questions not asked and actions not taken, I show how the regime’s methods of
understanding the outbreak also organized its ignorance of dangers outside its carefully constructed field of
vision. Applying agnotology theory, I argue that the industrial organization of leafy greens agriculture and
the institutionalized non-knowledge of emergent social–ecological vulnerabilities coproduce one another,
allowing the industrial food regime to avoid fundamental reforms that might enhance resilience. This case
demonstrates that critical examination of organized non-knowledge in complex environmental governance
systems can reveal limits to institutional learning and systemic reflexivity that impede sustainability
transitions.
Keywords: Food safety, Agnotology, Institutionalized non-knowledge, Reflexive adaptation, Coproduction,
Agriculture
Introduction
In early April of 2018, the U.S. Centers for Disease Con-
trol (CDC) and Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
identified a multistate outbreak of Escherichia coli
O157: H7, a dangerous foodborne pathogen. Agency in-
vestigators linked the outbreak to romaine lettuce grown
near Yuma, along the California–Arizona–Mexico borders
(CDC, 2018a), the primary growing region for winter
salad greens in the United States. Over the next several
weeks, 200 people fell ill, and 5 died. Consumers
stopped buying romaine lettuce of any type: “romaine
essentially just wasn’t being sold,” recalled a representa-
tive of the leafy greens industry (personal communica-
tion, October 1, 2018). Even more troubling, this was just
the latest episode in which the lettuce industry found
itself implicated in an E. coli outbreak (Table 1)—point-
ing to the likelihood of a systemic problem that long
predates this crisis (Painter et al., 2013; Bennett et al.,
2018; Marshall et al., 2020).
The 2018 Yuma outbreak closely mirrored a previous
multistate outbreak of E. coli O157: H7 in spinach, which
also sickened 200 people and killed 5 (CDC, 2006). The
leafy greens industry responded to that crisis with the
most comprehensive food safety protocol ever created
for fresh produce farms—the California Leafy Greens
Marketing Agreement (CA LGMA, 2019). By 2007, 99%
by volume of leafy greens growers in California, includ-
ing spinach and romaine lettuce farmers, were following
LGMA standards (Hardesty and Kusunose, 2009); Arizona
soon introduced its own, near-identical program (AZ
LGMA 2018).1 Including protocols for wildlife monitor-
ing, farmworker training, water testing, and other pre-
cautions, the LGMA sought to provide a comprehensive,
science-based system to control all the possible routes
through which dangerous human pathogens might con-
taminate crops growing in fields. Moreover, the LGMA
architects promised a robust system of institutional
learning and regular auditing to ensure that the stan-
dards would remain up-to-date and farmers would be
held accountable for following the protocol. The linchpin
of this system lay in data-intensive record-keeping prac-
tices designed to generate a chain of information that
would ensure constant use of “best agricultural
practices” and allow rapid traceback (and recall) of any
product suspected of contamination (Baur et al., 2017).
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Thus, by 2018, the leafy greens industry had taken
extensive steps to avoid repeating the deadly spinach
outbreak. Just the year before, LGMA leadership cele-
brated “ten years of protecting public health,” proclaim-
ing that “the leafy greens community has gotten better
at food safety” (Horsfall, 2017). Moreover, the elabora-
tion of further public and private regulations in the
intervening years—including the U.S. Food Safety Mod-
ernization Act of 2011 (FSMA) and the Global Food
Safety Initiative—seemed to offer extra layers of redun-
dant assurance (Verbruggen and Havinga, 2016; Baur et
al., 2017). Yet this massive investment in the ostensible
production of knowledge around farm-level foodborne
illness risks and food safety best practices failed
Table 1. Multistate Escherichia coli outbreaks linked to leafy green vegetables, 1999–2019. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1525/elementa.2021.00041.t1
Date Implicated Vegetable Illnesses Hospitalizations Deaths Source
December 2019 Romaine lettuce, kale, cabbage 10 4 0 FDA (2020)
November 2019 Unknown leafy green type 11 3 0 FDA (2020)
November 2019 Romaine lettuce 167 85 0 FDA (2020)
October 2018 Romaine lettuce 91 35 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
October 2018 Unknown leafy green type 25 8 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
October 2018 Unknown leafy green type 19 4 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
March 2018 Romaine lettuce 248 105 5 Marshall et al. (2020)
April 2018 Romaine lettuce 10 5 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
November 2017 Unknown leafy green type 67 26 2 Marshall et al. (2020)
September 2017 Spinach 8 3 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
August 2017 Unknown leafy green type 69 18 Marshall et al. (2020)
June 2016 Iceberg lettuce 11 4 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
April 2015 Unknown leafy green type 7 5 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
March 2015 Romaine lettuce 29 12 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
April 2014 Spinach 4 1 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
June 2014 Cabbage 16 2 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
November 2014 Romaine lettuce 11 2 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
October 2013 Romaine lettuce 33 9 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
Apr 2013 Iceberg lettuce 26 5 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
April 2013 Butter lettuce, radicchio 14 9 1 Marshall et al. (2020)
November 2012 Spinach 10 0 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
October 2012 Spinach, spring mix 33 13 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
June 2012 Romaine lettuce 52 0 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
October 2011 Romaine or iceberg lettuce 26 5 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
October 2011 Romaine lettuce 61 35 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
April 2010 Romaine lettuce 31 14 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
September 2009 Romaine lettuce 22 0 0 Marshall et al. (2020)
September 2008 Iceberg lettuce 74 NA 0 NORS
July 2008 Spinach 13 0 0 NORS
August 2006 Spinach 199 102 3 CDC (2006)
September 2005 Lettuce 34 12 0 NORS
September 2002 Iceberg lettuce 16 5 0 NORS
October 1999 Romaine lettuce 45 0 0 NORS
August 1999 Romaine lettuce 14 6 0 NORS
NORS ¼ National Outbreak Reporting System (https://wwwn.cdc.gov/norsdashboard/).
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dramatically in a moment of crisis. As the local Arizona
Republic reported:
None of these [food safety] procedures gets us any
closer to solving the mystery of how romaine became
contaminated with E. coli over the past three
growing seasons. There is also no guarantee the
combined efforts of the FDA, CDC, growers,
scientists and food researchers will stop the next
outbreak, an uneasy truth for the public to accept.
(Anglen, 2018b)
This case poses twin puzzles. First, why do food scares
plague leafy greens agriculture despite heavy investment
in regulatory tools designed to control pathogenic con-
tamination? Second, how do the industry and its regu-
lators maintain authority, and avoid substantive reform,
in the face of repeated lapses in control? One possible
explanation, and the one favored by the food safety
regime2 itself, is technoscientific deficit: The regime’s reg-
ulatory strategy is headed in the right direction, but
scientific understanding, available technologies, and
industry implementation have lagged behind the evolv-
ing risk posed by foodborne pathogens in the growing
environment and simply need to catch up. Another plau-
sible explanation favored by those critical of the regime
is blame avoidance: The industry and its regulators col-
lectively respond to outbreaks with “techniques of
neutralization” in order to avert reform and preserve the
existing configuration of power, as argued by Stuart and
Worosz (2012). I explore the evidence for a third expla-
nation, institutional non-knowledge: The food safety
regime is structurally incapable of recognizing the
social–ecological nature of the problem it faces. This
explanation, I propose, uniquely accounts for the subtle
cultural and cognitive dimensions that can lock the
regime into an unsustainable pathway leading to poten-
tial breakdown of both governing authority and social–
ecological function.
Focusing on institutional non-knowledge in this case
provides unique insight into conditions that impede sus-
tainability transitions. Repeated outbreaks linked to envi-
ronmental contamination that occurred in farm fields
suggest an acute problem in the social–ecological system
of leafy greens agriculture. Yet this ongoing crisis—which
causes significant health, political, and economic
harms—fails to trigger meaningful learning and adapta-
tion in the system that produced the crisis. As Lamine et
al. (2019) note in their introduction to a special issue on
sustainability transitions in agrifood systems,
“conventional logics and power relations are constantly
contending the rise of transition processes” despite the
expectation that the proliferation of profound problems
stemming from the conventional agrifood sector should
make such transitions “mandatory rather than optional.”
There seems to be an implied assumption that conven-
tional agrifood systems, faced with their own self-defeat,
will eventually have to accept fundamental changes to
how and under what conditions food is produced. Yet
concentrated industrial systems have continuously found
ways to sidestep their own contradictions (Weis, 2010),
often through “a spectacular form of temporal
deferment” (Moore, 2008). Given this tendency, it is
imperative to understand the causes and processes
through which industrial agrifood systems refuse to
adapt, even in the face of seemingly obvious systemic
failure. Attending to the possibility of institutionalized
non-knowledge may help illuminate a critical, though
easily overlooked, facet of barriers to transition.
The paper proceeds by first laying the conceptual
foundation, rooted in the field of ignorance studies (ag-
notology), for institutionalized non-knowledge as a key
factor explaining why systems fail to adapt to crisis.
Next, I describe the process tracing methodology I use
to analyze whether and how institutionalized non-
knowledge shaped industry and regulatory responses to
the outbreak. I present the results in three sections
describing the outbreak investigation (highlighting ques-
tions not asked), the regime’s response (highlighting ac-
tions not taken), and a hypothetical alternative way of
knowing about foodborne danger (highlighting the con-
tingency of the regime’s knowledge–power configura-
tion). In the discussion, I consider how the regime’s
methods of understanding the outbreak also organized
its ignorance of dangers outside its carefully constructed
field of vision, leading to a critical disconnect between
crisis and response: The food safety problem emerges at
a systemic social–ecological level, but the regime is only
designed to “see” linear causal chains of contamination
and the isolated accountability of individual firms.
Together, I argue, these scientific and regulatory limita-
tions blind the food safety regime both to emergent
immunodeficiencies of conventional industrial agricul-
ture and to possibilities for transitioning toward higher
social–ecological resilience.
Trust, control, and non-knowledge
In the context of complex, ever-changing food systems,
perfectly safe food cannot be guaranteed. Risk, in other
words, is never zero (Wilson and Worosz, 2014). This
poses a constant threat to the legitimacy and credibility
of food safety regimes. To stabilize their authority, such
regimes must answer a central governing problem: how
to “build trust in the face of inevitable foodborne risks”
(Freidberg, 2004, p. v). Food safety regimes increasingly
turn to elaborate systems of standards—which promise to
hold food producers and handlers to account through
objective, third-party evaluation grounded in scientific
evidence (Loconto and Busch, 2010; Baur et al., 2017;
Verbruggen and Havinga, 2017)—as a means to produce
trust in industry, scientists, and government regulators
2. I use the term regime to encompass the full network of
public and private actors who govern food safety risks by
setting standards, monitoring compliance, and taking
enforcement actions in the case of failure (Loconto and Busch,
2010; Havinga and Verbruggen, 2017; Ansell and Baur, 2018).
This network includes industry leaders, government regulators,
third-party auditors, and the experts who inform their
decisions.
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among the consuming public.3 A primary threat to pub-
lic trust in food systems are destabilizing “food scares”
that garner media attention, upset normal patterns of
demand and consumption, and spark political pressure
for reform (Knowles et al., 2007; DeLind and Howard,
2008; Loeber et al., 2011; Lytton, 2019). Standards buffer
markets from such periodic disruptions (Busch, 2007;
Busch, 2011), largely through preserving an “illusion of
control” (Stuart, 2008): the perception that the regime
sufficiently knows the sources of foodborne danger and
wields that knowledge effectively to protect the public.
Control thus represents a particular formation of knowl-
edge and authority upon which the regime builds its
legitimacy and credibility, claims trustworthiness, and
then seeks stability (Baur et al., 2017; Ansell and Baur,
2018).
Despite ostensible antipathy toward instability, how-
ever, the regime’s pursuit of control exists in tension with
its need to allow some foodborne pathogens to “overflow”
that grid of control. As Dunn (2007) argues:
Overflow is not an occasional occurrence, or an
indicator that the system has failed. It is a regular,
endemic, integral part of a system that restlessly
seeks dangers beyond its control, expands to
encompass and regularize those dangers and begins
the cycle of seeking and expansion again when it
discovers dangers that have overflowed the system’s
parameters.
According to Dunn’s “sewer state” theory, food scares
are in fact a necessary product of the food safety regime.
Rather than governance failures, outbreaks serve as the
regime’s raison d’être. Sewer-state theory suggests a tan-
gible incentive for food safety regimes to preserve igno-
rance of the continual systemic causes of discrete
foodborne outbreaks. To understand precisely how igno-
rance enables the food safety regime to simultaneously
pursue control and tolerate overflow, I apply agnotology
theory.
Agnotology scholars study the social production of
ignorance, or non-knowledge (Proctor, 2008; Croissant,
2014; Gross and McGoey, 2015). Producing knowledge
means sorting observations into those “meaningful to
know” and those not. Ignorance has thus been theo-
rized as a necessary corollary to knowledge (Harding,
2000, p. 131; Gross, 2010, p. 1), its “shadow” to extend
the metaphor of knowledge as enlightenment. Knowing
is both creative and destructive: Producing one form of
knowledge entails forsaking alternate forms that could
have been. Not-knowing, then, is inherently a political
act, entangled with power relations (see Rubio and
Baert, 2013). McGoey (2012a, 2012b), for example,
shows how “strategic ignorance” can be “a productive
asset, helping individuals and institutions to command
resources, deny liability in the aftermath of crises, and
to assert expertise in the face of unpredictable out-
comes” (McGoey, 2012b). Claiming ignorance, especially
in reference to “undone science” (Hess, 2009), tacitly estab-
lishes a priority: It is imperative to know more about X in
order to have more power, or control, over X (McGoey,
2012b). Likewise, strategic ignorance can facilitate blame
avoidance. Stuart and Worosz (2012) argued that industrial
agribusinesses embrace self-non-knowledge, or “anti-re-
flexivity,” toward the systemic risks they themselves produce
in order to absolve themselves of responsibility and avoid
regulatory reform.
Ignorance can be analyzed as a strategic resource
without assuming that its production necessarily follows
a “conspiratorial logic” intent on deflecting or concealing
knowledge that is inconvenient or threatening to
acknowledge (Frickel and Edwards, 2014). Frickel and
Vincent (2007) examine how formal protocols for mon-
itoring environmental toxins “organize ignorance” in
a way that “masks ecological complexity.” Building on
this argument, Frickel and Edwards (2014) demonstrate
the ways in which “institutional logics of risk
assessment”—in an effort to “know more about less” and
“make less knowledge count for more”—tacitly make de-
cisions as to which kinds and degrees of potential ha-
zards matter and which do not. Other scholars have
likewise examined what I refer to as institutionalized non-
knowledge, for example, in the under-regulation of pesti-
cides (Kleinman and Suryanarayanan, 2013), remediating
contaminated soils (Gross and Bleicher, 2013), and map-
ping toxic water contamination (Rabinow and Poirier,
2017). Durant (2020), writing on bee-toxicity warnings for
pesticide labels, andMartin (2019), writing on environmen-
tal governance of wolf-livestock conflict, both offer compel-
ling accounts of the individually rational, yet systemically
dysfunctional, production of official non-knowledge that
can arise in complex governance networks. These contribu-
tions show how underlying knowledge infrastructures
mask organized ignorance by black-boxing key decisions
deep within technical guidance documents, data collection
practices, professional norms, and social relationships
within epistemic communities.
I focus on the ways in which non-knowledge is insti-
tutionalized through standards. Freidberg (2017) pro-
vides a roadmap with her insight, based on analysis
of commodity grain trading, that, “by guiding the pro-
duction of knowledge, standards and related tools also
serve to normalize ignorance.” She argued that the non-
knowledge of origin intrinsic to modern commodity
grain crops (see Cronon, 1991: 97–142), which grants
them a fungibility necessary for transnational corpora-
tions to reach global market dominance, is becoming
a liability as sustainability demands pressure commod-
ity traders to track grains from farm to fork. Yet,
“despite these companies’ size, clout, and supposedly
unparalleled market intelligence, they have found it
difficult to supply the needed information” (Freidberg,
2017). This observation also applies to leafy greens:
Despite the food safety regime’s investment in trace-
ability and oversight, it cannot determine where con-
tamination comes from, let alone how to stop it. That
3. On the relationship among auditing, verification, and
trust, see Power (1997, 2004).
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outbreaks have become “normal accidents” (Perrow,
1999) demonstrates the regimes’ ignorance of its own
epistemic and political limitations, which stymies learn-
ing and adaptation.
Attending to the ways in which expert institutions, and
the standards they deploy, encode non-knowledge shows
how strategic not-knowing limits capacity to effectively,
sustainably, and equitably govern complex systems (Frick-
el and Edwards, 2014; Rabinow and Poirier, 2017). The
presence of such limits, I suggest, may help explain how
dominant governance systems pose both epistemic and
political obstructions to sustainability transitions. In par-
ticular, this conceptual lens articulates clearly with that of
coproduction, a lens that advises scholars to observe and
explain the ways in which ordering the natural world
through science and ordering the social world through
power relations are mutually constitutive (Jasanoff,
2004). Examining how the industrial organization of leafy
greens agriculture and the institutionalized non-
knowledge of systemic risks coproduce one another illu-
minates the peculiar knowledge–power formation that
allows the food safety regime to navigate, even feed on,
the tension between control and overflow, and thereby
avoid fundamental reorganization of the social-
ecological relationships that underpin conventional indus-
trial agriculture.
Methods and analytical approach
Above, I posed twin puzzles: Why do outbreaks keep
happening in leafy greens, and why does the food safety
regime for this industry stay in power despite repeat
failures? The case of the 2018 Yuma E. coli outbreak
provides an empirical opportunity to assess whether, in
what ways, and to what extent the novel hypothesis
I introduced—institutionalized non-knowledge—better ex-
plains these puzzles than do either the technoscientific
deficit or blame avoidance hypotheses. To do so, I employ
a process tracing method of causal inference. Process
tracing begins with a detailed description of the
sequence of events, from which the analyst seeks to
parse the most salient causal factors and compare them
to the claims made by competing hypotheses that might
explain the case (Bennett, 2010; Collier, 2011). For the
Yuma outbreak, I organize my analysis in response to
three empirical questions: How did officials investigate
the outbreak, through which scientific approaches and
institutional arrangements, and what did they seek to
find? How did industry and its regulators respond? and
What kinds of questions were not asked, and what kinds
of action were not taken?
I draw on public documents that display the official
knowledge institutionalized by the regime and circu-
lated in public discourse. Through primary documents
such as reports and press releases, regime members
expressed their understanding of causality, uncertainty,
and responsibility for the outbreak and stated their
consequent plans and strategies. Secondary sources,
especially newspaper articles, yield evidence on how
representatives of the regime reported preliminary
knowledge, interpreted findings, and expressed their
intentions for the public; these sources also provide
an outlet for critiques of the outbreak investigation and
response. No documents were intentionally excluded
unless they provided no unique pertinent evidence.4 All
documents analyzed are fully cited in the references.
Given these materials, I use the following criteria to
assess the three competing hypotheses. The technos-
cientific deficit claim will explain the puzzles well if
there is strong evidence that the outbreak happened
because (a) the tools and best practices available to
farmers were not precise or fast enough to control the
microbiological threat (Marshall et al., 2020); (b) the
tools and best practices were adequate, but leafy greens
growers had not yet adopted them (Julien-Javaux et al.,
2019); or (c) there were other controllable risk factors in
the growing environment for which the risk manage-
ment model had not accounted, such as seasonality
(Marshall et al., 2020). Each type of evidence would
plausibly establish that the outbreak was caused by
a technoscientific deficit which the regime could rea-
sonably be expected to “fix” within its existing config-
uration of power.
The blame avoidance claim will explain the puzzles
well if there is strong evidence that groups within the
regime deployed techniques of neutralization during
the investigation and the interpretation of its findings
that either (a) denied responsibility by shifting blame
elsewhere, such as onto individual “bad actors” or
agents beyond the regime’s control or (b) appealed to
a “higher loyalty” such as profitability, production effi-
ciency, or technological optimism to downplay the very
idea that there is something for which to be blamed
(Stuart and Worosz, 2012). Either type of evidence
would plausibly establish that the regime worked to
avoid inconvenient findings that might undermine its
authority.
The institutionalized non-knowledge claim will explain
the puzzles well if there is strong evidence that (a) the
investigation failed to provide an internally consistent
account of the outbreak due to omissions, discrepancies,
and ambiguities in its process or findings and (b) the
regime’s response to the outbreak failed to account for
those inconsistencies in either form or content. Together,
both types of evidence would plausibly establish that the
regime is epistemically limited by systemic blind spots in
its awareness of the risk landscape confronting leafy
greens agriculture.
My approach modifies conventional process tracing in
two ways. First, although counterfactuals are sometimes
used in process tracing as “contrast space” in framing the
analysis (Collier, 2011), agnotology requires an explicit
focus on what is not there. In other words, both the
explanatory factors and the outcomes to be explained
include counterfactuals. Following Levy (2008), I ground
4. “Probative value” is the primary criterion by which the
process tracing analyst decides whether a given piece of
evidence is pertinent. As Bennett (2010) explains, “What
matters is not the amount of evidence, but its contribution to
adjudicating among alternative hypotheses.”
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my use of counterfactuals in a strong theoretical frame-
work (see previous section) and a careful account of how
the regime could plausibly have known the nature of the
risk it faces differently and how this might impact its
response.
Second, although conventional process tracing con-
centrates on establishing causal direction between
explanatory factors and outcomes (Bennett, 2010), I hew
to the coproductionist framework developed in Science
and Technology Studies (Jasanoff, 2004), which holds
that a given settlement between scientific and social
orders—such as the stable network of experts, regulators,
and practitioners which I call the food safety regime—are
“points of arrival rather than departure” (Curnutte and
Testa, 2012). Rather than attempting to simply disprove
or weaken either the technoscientific deficit or blame
avoidance claims, my analysis instead traces the net-
works of interdependence between the technical frame-
work for assessing foodborne risk and the political
framework for contesting its management. These under-
lying sociotechnical networks normally stabilize the re-
gime’s epistemological and normative commitments in
such a way that they “recede into the background” and
are easily mistaken for a fixed feature rather than an
active process shaping the course of events (Latour,
2005, pp. 79–82). However, moments of breakdown
(e.g., an outbreak) provide a brief window into the fun-
damental contingency of these settlements. With its
focus on what cannot and shall not be known, agnotol-
ogy sharpens analysis of the destabilization and restabi-
lization of these networks as processes that might have
unfolded via a different set of normative and epistemo-
logical commitments.
Case: multistate outbreak of E. coli O157: H7
linked to romaine lettuce
I turn next to my case, the outbreak of E. coli O157: H7
linked to romaine lettuce grown along the Arizona–Cali-
fornia border. Trouble began in late March 2018, when the
first victims began to fall ill (Figure 1). By April 10, when
CDC first recognized the outbreak, the same strain of E.
coli had sickened 17 people across seven states (CDC,
2018a). By the time CDC declared the outbreak over on
June 28, the pathogen had stricken 210 people across 36
states, claiming the lives of five.
E. coli O157: H7 is the most common type of Shiga
toxin-producing E. coli (STEC), a class of bacterial human
pathogens that cause severe gastrointestinal illness, kid-
ney damage, and even death. Over the past two decades,
31% of multistate foodborne STEC outbreaks implicated
vegetable agriculture (Olimpi et al., 2019), and particularly
the industrial-scale lettuce operations overseen by LGMA
(Turner et al., 2019). Between 2009 and 2017 alone, leafy
greens were implicated in 28 STEC outbreaks, averaging
more than three per year (Ostroff and Plaisier, 2018). Ac-
cording to the most recent analysis, “leafy greens are the
second most common source of foodborne STEC O157
outbreaks, after ground beef,” in both the United States
and Canada (Marshall et al., 2020). As the list of repeated
E. coli outbreaks in the United States presented in Table 1
suggests, food scares appear to be endemic to industrial
leafy greens agriculture.
Figure 1. Timeline of Escherichia coli O157: H7 outbreak in romaine lettuce. Bar chart shows number of illnesses
associated with the outbreak reported by day, overlaid by dates and descriptions of key epidemiologic events (red),
investigation activities (yellow), and public announcements (blue). Adapted from CDC (2018a). DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1525/elementa.2021.00041.f1
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Investigation of the outbreak
The Yuma outbreak garnered significant attention from
public health officials, food safety regulators, the produce
industry, and the general public. Pressure was high for
federal investigators to quickly identify the responsible
party and halt the outbreak.
Stage 1: Traceback investigation
The outbreak investigation followed standard procedure
(CDC, 2018b). Following up on a cluster of E. coli poison-
ings in New Jersey, CDC used PulseNet—a network of
databases on infectious disease incidences maintained
by over 80 clinical laboratories in partnership with
CDC—to locate other people who had fallen ill with the
same subtype of E. coli.5 Public health officials then
interviewed 28 victims, 93% of whom reported eating
romaine lettuce (CDC, 2018a: April 13 announcement).
Based on interviewee recollections of where they pur-
chased the romaine and the seasonal timing (Latack and
Ozeran, 2020), FDA identified romaine lettuce from
Yuma as the likely source of the outbreak on April 13
(FDA, 2018a). The same day, CDC warned consumers not
to eat bagged, chopped romaine lettuce from the region
(Chokshi, 2018), though a week later the advocacy orga-
nization Consumer Reports, citing an abundance of cau-
tion, urged consumers to avoid all romaine lettuce
(Parker-Pope, 2018). CDC expanded its own warning the
next day, April 20, based on a new report of eight in-
mates who had fallen ill after eating whole-head
romaine at a prison in Alaska (CDC, 2018a: April 20
announcement). Although the romaine lettuce harvest
in the Yuma region ended on April 16, FDA did not
receive this information from the LGMA until May 2.
Moreover, the 21-day shelf life of bagged romaine left
officials concerned that contaminated product might still
be circulating. CDC did not lift its consumer warning
until May 16 (Fox, 2018).
Meanwhile, the investigation proceeded.With an initial
list of 23 locations where victims had acquired the con-
taminated romaine, FDA initiated a traceback procedure
to reverse, stepwise, the path that contaminated romaine
had traveled through the supply chain (Latack and Ozeran,
2020). The outbreak investigators soon hit an unexpected
roadblock, as NPR reported:
Many food safety experts expected [the
investigation] to lead to a single farm or a factory
where the contamination happened . . . But in this
case, it proved impossible. The trails of contaminated
lettuce did not converge on any single point.
Instead, there were lots of trails, leading to different
processing plants and a bunch of different farms in
Yuma, miles apart. (Charles, 2018)
The traceback paths led to 36 suspect fields from 23
farms managed by 16 different growers. The investigation
stalled there: “With the exception of one instance where
one of the legs of the traceback led to a single farm, it was
not possible to determine which, or how many, of these
farms shipped lettuce that was contaminated with the
outbreak strain” (FDA, 2018b).
A transcript of a conference call between journalists
and members of the investigation team on April 27 pro-
vides insight into how the investigators perceived this
problem in the moment. When asked how many farms
were under investigation, Dr Stic Harris, the Director of
FDA’s Coordinated Outbreak Response and Evaluation
Network, replied:
Over two dozen . . .One of the things about this
particular outbreak is there are so many [traceback]
legs to chase . . .And, you know, trying to link those
altogether [sic] and, you know, there’s a lot of
disparity between them. (FDA and CDC, 2018)
The journalists pressed the investigators to clarify how
these “legs” represented the same outbreak and how the
team planned to make sense of the “disparity between
them.” The following discussion offers clues to the inves-
tigators’ expectations and awareness of their own limits.
“We have many lines of evidence . . . that all of these ill-
nesses are connected in some way through romaine grown
in the Yuma growing region,” explained Dr Matthew Wise
of the CDC Outbreak Response Teams, continuing, “As we
get more detailed analysis done, I think, what we’ll try and
see is if there’s any additional differentiation that we
might be able to see in the genetic data [from WGS
sequencing] that would correlate with some of these dif-
ferent farm sources . . . It could be two adjacent fields that
share the same water source or things like that” (FDA and
CDC, 2018). Crucially, Wise’s hopes rested on “more
detailed analysis” that might resolve the ambiguous rela-
tionship among the traceback, epidemiological, and
genetic sequencing data streams into neat causal chains.
But Harris interjected a cautionary note. “I think there’s
a perception . . .when we do traceback that each leg is just
a direct line down,” warned Harris, “And in this case,
you’re looking more at a web . . . Ideally we’d love to get
those mapped out and try and find convergence some-
place to identify that specific cause. We’re just not there
yet. And we—it’s entirely possible we may not get there”
(FDA and CDC, 2018). When questioned further on the
investigation’s limitations, the discussion turned to speed
and accuracy. “Couldn’t we get some sort of labeling at
harvest level and then through the supply chain that
would kind of provide the traceback you guys need to
do this quicker?” asked one reporter. Harris replied,
“Under FSMA it’s a one step forward, one step back rule.
And so, trying to find all those records whether they be
5. CDC uses the PulseNet and related FoodNet systems to
detect outbreaks by linking together clusters of related
illnesses (Yeni et al., 2016). The databases are populated with
information from clinical samples submitted to laboratories for
pathogen testing. U.S. health care providers are required to
report “notifiable” pathogens like Escherichia coli to county or
state health departments, which in turn notify CDC for entry
into the databases.
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digital records, or written records, or handwritten records
is extremely tough.”
At the surface level, this exchange seems to reveal evi-
dence for technoscientific deficit. The investigators are
confident that the tools exist (genetic sequencing, trace-
back procedures) to understand the source and transmis-
sion pathway of the pathogen, but the industry has not
fully adopted those tools (particularly accurate, accessible
records). There may even be unaccounted risk factors such
as shared irrigation water. Some evidence for blame avoid-
ance presents itself, as well. Harris’ statement subtly shifts
responsibility for the investigation’s problems by attribut-
ing technical deficit—lack of timely access to records of the
lettuce’s travel through time and space—to both policy-
makers (an implied shortcoming in the law) and growers
(whose record-keeping is implied to be disorganized).
A deeper examination of the investigation’s troubles,
however, reveals the first traces of institutionalized non-
knowledge. In extending their “epistemic reach” (Frickel
and Edwards, 2014), the outbreak investigators also
organized their ignorance of the underlying food sys-
tem in a way that masked their epistemic limits. The
final traceback diagram—attached to FDA’s investigation
report, released in October 2018—reveals a fundamental
ambiguity in the agency’s reconstruction of the contam-
ination which led to the outbreak, one which cannot be
attributed to deficit or to the actions of others. As
shown in Figure 2, the number of farms identified in
the diagram is either 15 or 26, depending on how one
interprets the final row. In either case, the numbers and
labels do not match the 16 growers, 23 farms, and 36
fields cited in the text of FDA’s final investigation
report, to which the diagram is attached (FDA, 2018c).
This discrepancy is compounded when comparing the
October diagram to an earlier version released on May 31
(Gottlieb and Ostroff, 2018). The May diagram shows
a much tidier picture (Figure 3), which would seem coun-
terintuitive given that it was created before the investiga-
tion team actually visited the Yuma region to conduct an
environmental assessment (discussed below).6 This earlier
diagram eschews the “farm” label used in the final report
and instead refers to “ranches”—a term for agricultural
land parcels specific to California and Arizona agricul-
ture—while also extending the traceback to individual
fields (only 33), which are absent in the October diagram.
Finally, the May diagram includes limited location infor-
mation for shippers—who aggregate lettuce from multiple
sites—that is not reported in the October diagram. Neither
diagram provides farm-level locations.
These discrepancies between the diagrams suggest that
FDA underwent an internal struggle to neatly categorize,
Figure 2. Final traceback diagram for Yuma outbreak, October 2018. Blue indicates the point of service from which
investigators initiated traceback. Yellow indicates intermediate supply chain actors. Red indicates the last point to
which investigators were able to trace suspected product. Adapted from FDA (2018c, Attachment A). DOI: https://
doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00041.f2
6. For ease of comparison, I have adapted each traceback
diagram to a common format while preserving as closely as
possible the precise labels, terminology, and linkages shown by
the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in each case.
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for the purposes of the standardized traceback process,
a spatially and legally heterogeneous and dynamic indus-
try.7 A typical row vegetable “farm” in California will grow
on multiple leased plots of land (ranches) that are physi-
cally separated and will engage in complex contracting
and subcontracting arrangements that can split up culti-
vation, harvest, handling, and processing among legally
distinct businesses. To populate categories such as “farm,”
“field,” and “grower,” the investigators had to make sub-
jective decisions about how to codify that dynamic com-
plexity into discrete nodes and linkages that fit the simple
supply chain model implicit in their standard traceback
procedure. In so doing, the investigators simultaneously
structured what they would not know about edge cases
(e.g., the hybrid entities labeled processor/grower-
handlers D and E in Figure 3), actors involved outside the
immediate supply chain (e.g., the pesticide applicators
discovered during the environmental assessment), and re-
lationships other than the exchange of romaine lettuce
(e.g., hydrological flows or personnel movement among
fields). These forms of non-knowledge appear to be en-
coded within the institutions of traceback investigation,
yet nowhere in the public record is any underlying incon-
sistency in the traceback procedure itself acknowledged,
Figure 3. Early traceback diagram, May 31, 2018. POS stands for point of service, DC for distribution center, PR for
processor, and GH for grower-harvester. A ranch refers to a contiguous area of land leased for cultivation by the grower
and may contain multiple fields. Dashed lines indicate reported relationships for which no records were available.
Source: Adapted from FDA (Gottlieb and Ostroff, 2018). DOI: https://doi.org/10.1525/elementa.2021.00041.f3
7. Admittedly, the available evidence tells us little about
the reason for the discrepancies in the traceback diagrams.
There are various possible reasons why an earlier diagram
might differ from a later diagram. The traceback approach
might change due to an exogenous factor such as a personnel
changeover within the agency or a revision to agency
protocols. Conversely, differences might arise due to internal
learning, for example, if investigators learned to see the nodes
and linkages in a way more clearly aligned with the ways in
which practitioners themselves understand the flow of leafy
greens. That said, what the available evidence does
demonstrate is a clear internal inconsistency within the
traceback stage of the investigation. Changing the definition
of the nodes used to reconstruct the path of contaminated
lettuce is a significant ontological shift, especially since the
later diagram seems to veer away from, rather than toward,
terminology used by growers and shippers.That the agency did
not acknowledge, let alone explain, this fundamental shift in its
official narrative points to an unreflexive stance that is
characteristic of institutionalized non-knowledge.
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let alone taken into account during the formulation of
a response.
Stage 2: Environmental assessment
Given the inconclusive traceback, the FDA Commissioner
conceded at the end of May, “there isn’t a simple or obvi-
ous explanation for how this outbreak occurred.” How-
ever, he reassured the public that, “We are actively
evaluating a number of theories about how romaine let-
tuce grown on multiple farms in the same growing region
could have become contaminated around the same time”
(Gottlieb and Ostroff, 2018). To that end, on June 4, 6
weeks after the romaine harvest ended, FDA and CDC
dispatched a team of 15 investigators to Yuma to conduct
a retrospective environmental assessment. Their mission:
first, to collect environmental samples from likely
sources—including wild animal feces, irrigation canals,
and cattle feedlots—to see whether they could detect the
outbreak strain and, second, to discover the farming prac-
tices responsible for linking the pathogen source to
romaine lettuce (FDA, 2018c).
The team interviewed 14 growers, who together man-
aged 21 of the 23 farms implicated during traceback. As
shown in Figure 4, those farms were geographically dis-
parate.8 The only plausible environmental link (assuming
a one-to-one, linear contamination pathway) was the Col-
orado River, from which all 21 farms drew irrigation water,
supplied by four independent irrigation districts. The in-
vestigators focused on these districts, where they collected
environmental samples in June, July, and August. The
nearest common point is the Imperial Dam, located on
the California–Arizona border just north of Yuma city.
However, no Colorado River samples tested positive for
the outbreak strain, possibly because several months sep-
arated any hypothetical contamination event from the
investigators’ samples (FDA, 2018c).
As cattle are a primary source of STEC, the investigation
team paid close attention to concentrated animal feeding
operations (CAFOs) in the vicinity of the suspected farms.
Figure 4. Environmental assessment investigation area. Affected farms drew water from all four irrigation districts, but
the environmental assessment only reported samples from the Imperial County Irrigation District and the WMIDD.
Harrison Farms, the only grower named in the investigation, appears to lie outside of all four irrigation districts under
investigation, although it may operate fields in other locations. Investigators sampled water at numerous locations,
but only three samples taken near the McElhaney Cattle Company’s concentrated animal feeding operations tested
positive for the outbreak strain. Adapted from (FDA, 2018c), image created in Google Earth1. DOI: https://doi.org/
10.1525/elementa.2021.00041.f4
8. FDA generally does not publicly disclose identifying
information, including addresses or coordinates, of companies
involved in an investigation unless there is a pressing public
health justification. Although the precise location of the
implicated farms is unavailable, FDA’s public report does map
general locations of concern.
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Three CAFOs were found to be operating in Yuma County,
AZ, though the investigation focused on one near to sev-
eral affected farms, the McElhaney Cattle Company (An-
glen, 2018b). Imperial County in California also has
several CAFOs, and the investigators collected samples
from at least two that were near other farms under inves-
tigation, as well as from nearby ponds and irrigation ca-
nals. Although they found non-O157 STEC as well as six
genetically distinct strains of E. coli O157: H7, the team did
not detect the outbreak strain. The only samples that
tested positive for the outbreak strain came from a 3.5-
mile stretch of the Wellton Canal running adjacent to the
McElhaney Cattle Company (Anglen, 2018b; FDA, 2018c).
The investigation team struggled to make sense of
these piecemeal findings, which raised new questions of
“just how and why this strain of E. coli O157: H7 could
have gotten into this body of water and how that led to
contamination of romaine lettuce from multiple farms”
(Gottlieb, 2018, June 28 statement). In attempting to
reconstruct the contamination, the investigators hit an
obstacle at each link in the causal chain. First, they could
not establish firm evidence of a link between the McElha-
ney Cattle Company and the contaminated canal water.
They collected six samples of manure and water from the
CAFO site but did not detect the outbreak strain. More-
over, the investigators noted that “measures implemented
to prevent contamination of the irrigation canal from the
feedlot . . . suggest runoff would be prevented from enter-
ing the canal” (FDA, 2018c, p. 14). They hypothesized that
the high turnover of cattle on the feedlot combined with
the lag-time between any contamination and sampling
might explain the lack of positive test results and that
underground seepage might account for the route of
transmission to the canal. Nonetheless, critical observers
questioned how the pathogen traveled upstream (Anglen,
2018b) and why cattle that had been there for decades
suddenly caused a problem (Charles, 2018).
Second, the investigators could not determine how
water from a single canal contaminated 36 separate farm
fields across multiple irrigation districts. Although irriga-
tion water generally does not contact the edible portion of
romaine lettuce, the interviewed growers indicated that
canal water is often used to mix and dilute agrochemicals
that are then sprayed onto the edible leaves. Most growers
hire independent contractors, known as applicators, to
spray agrochemicals. The investigation team interviewed
two applicators contracted by 11 of the 13 farms in the
irrigation district served by the Wellton Canal. One re-
ported using canal water to mix the sprays, establishing
a plausible contamination pathway for five farms. That still
left the puzzle of how romaine from the other 16 farms
became contaminated. The investigation concluded with
these questions unresolved:
FDA has concluded that the water from the
irrigation canal where the outbreak strain was
found most likely led to contamination of the
romaine lettuce consumed during this outbreak.
FDA cannot rule out that other sources or means of
romaine lettuce contamination with the outbreak
strain of E. coli O157: H7 may have occurred. There
are several ways that irrigation canal water may
have come in contact with the implicated romaine
lettuce including direct application to the crop and/
or use of irrigation canal water to dilute crop
protection chemicals applied to the lettuce crop . . .
How and when the irrigation canal became
contaminated with the outbreak strain is unknown.
A large animal feeding operation is nearby but no
obvious route for contamination from this facility to
the irrigation canal was identified. Other
explanations are possible although the EA team
found no evidence to support them. (FDA, 2018b)
This conclusion is notable more for its absences than
for its positive findings. Abundantly clear, however, is the
disjoint between the investigation team’s attempts to
trace the causal pathway stepwise back through time and
the actual conditions on the ground that produced an
outbreak. Months passed between when the lettuce was
contaminated (March) and the environmental assessment
(June)—during this time, much evidence disappeared from
the environment. Yet the environmental assessment report
only references this time lag twice: first to note, “Because
the Yuma region’s growing season had concluded weeks
before the EA started, no leafy greens were available for
sampling and testing,” and second to argue that “the out-
break strain may have been present in the irrigation canal
months before the EA team collected the positive
samples” (FDA, 2018b). Strikingly, FDA does not ask
whether the time lag might also explain the absence of
evidence on which grounds the agency effectively dis-
missed other possible explanatory factors—specifically leaf
damage or wind-blown contamination are mentioned—in
favor of its preferred culprit, contaminated canal water,
which explanation itself posed unresolved mysteries.
Also unresolved is the ambiguity over precisely what
counts as a contaminant. Although numerous positive
samples of human pathogens were discovered throughout
the environmental assessment, only those few that
matched the outbreak strain mattered. Other human
pathogens detected during the assessment were recorded
(FDA, 2018c, Table 6), but these potentially dangerous
microbes, and their sources, received no more than pass-
ing mention in the final report. Again, FDA does not ask
whether the widespread presence of human pathogens
beyond the outbreak strain might itself indicate a broader
risk factor for the region, recommending only that gov-
ernment agencies and the industry continue to “explore
possible source(s) and route(s) of contamination associ-
ated with the outbreak pathogen and with other food-
borne pathogens of public health significance” (FDA,
2018b).
In summation, the report not only provides an inter-
nally inconsistent account of the events which led to con-
tamination and thence to outbreak but moreover fails to
acknowledge, let alone address, the potential limitations
suggested by those inconsistencies. This is evidence of






enta.2021.00041.pdf by guest on 21 M
arch 2021
institutionalized non-knowledge. The environmental as-
sessment’s failure to “solve” the outbreak does not appear
to result primarily from technoscientific deficiency:
although technical capacity (e.g., mobilization speed) and
surprise risk factors (e.g., chemical sprays mixed with
water) played a role, they cannot account for the assess-
ment’s basic incapacity to produce the kind of information
about the agricultural environment that regime experts
would be able to recognize as contamination. Nor does
that failure seem to result directly from blame avoidance.
The assessment reinforces the severity of the “largest STEC
outbreak in over a decade,” and its recommendations stick
to FDA’s long-standing strategy to exhort the leafy greens
industry to more diligently follow hazard analysis and
control strategies (see Baur et al., 2017), effectively argu-
ing that all such factors can be managed, and are thus
within the regime’s orbit of control.
Considering both stages of the outbreak investigation,
when confronted with a complex system, the regime fell
victim to its epistemic limits, particularly an inability to
recognize and address social and ecological relationships
that lay outside its standard conceptual model of how
pathogens contaminate food. In the traceback process,
investigators lamented encountering a “web” of overlap-
ping economic and legal dimensions in the fast-paced
lettuce industry rather than the simple “line” they desired.
They seemed bewildered by the possibility that contami-
nation might flow through pathways that only imperfectly
map to the physical flow of lettuce through time and
space, which itself maps imperfectly to the nodes and
distribution channels of the supply chain. Likewise, in the
environmental assessment, investigators appeared stub-
bornly fixated on identifying a singular source (canal
water) and a singular pathway (agrochemical sprays),
downplaying or rejecting evidence which suggested amore
complex web of causality encompassing layered ecologi-
cal, geographic, meteorological, hydrological, and mana-
gerial relationships. The dynamic and open-ended
conditions of farming in nature seem largely illegible to
the environmental assessment mode of inquiry.
Due to institutionalized non-knowledge, and despite
substantial motivation for all parties involved to deter-
mine the source of the outbreak, the investigation pro-
duced more unasked than answered questions. In
considering these inconclusive results, FDA missed an
opportunity to question whether the investigation tar-
geted the right scale. There is another way to consider the
conditions that gave rise to the outbreak: The Yuma region
contains many sources of human pathogens that can flow
and be dispersed through numerous environmental media
(water, air, animals, equipment, people), and yet also
grows vast quantities of a crop known to be susceptible
to pathogenic colonization which is then centrally pro-
cessed before being shipped all over the country (and
abroad) as fast as possible. Is the culprit then an isolated
slip in control that let STEC into the food supply, or a vul-
nerable production system that gave STEC an ideal plat-
form on which to spread? Failure to grapple with the
implications of the latter question left industry and gov-
ernment actors with treacherously unstable footing upon
which to reassert trust in the regime’s control over food-
borne dangers.
Official responses to the outbreak
Despite the investigatory failure, the Yuma outbreak cat-
alyzed significant regulatory and industry response. In
a letter to the leafy greens industry released concurrently
with the environmental assessment report on November
1, 2018, FDA presented a stern message: “more must be
done as the status quo is unacceptable” (Ostroff and Plai-
sier, 2018). The letter reiterated,
It is industry’s role to ensure that the foods they
bring to market are safe for consumers to eat.
Therefore, we urge all segments of the leafy greens
industry to review their operations and make all
necessary changes. FDA sets standards for the safe
growing [and handling] . . . of produce and works in
collaboration with our state counterparts to ensure
compliance with these standards . . .We also see
a need to improve our response actions during
outbreaks . . .
The letter recommended that state and federal
agencies:
 Speed-up investigations, including laboratory
results, environmental assessments, and
stakeholder communication.
 Expand surveillance and testing capacity,
including routinely collecting and testing
romaine lettuce samples to determine
whether they are legally adulterated.9
 Increase local collaboration, stressing the
importance of “local in-depth knowledge and
actions” during outbreak investigation.
And recommended that industry:
 Enhance internal policies, including assessing
and mitigating risks, verifying implementa-
tion, and conducting root cause analysis when
a foodborne pathogen is detected in the
“growing or processing environment.”
 Adopt state-of-the-art traceability technology,
specifically “the ability to identify specific
farms or ranches” so as to expeditiously
“determine which farm(s) and growing region
are responsible.”
 Fund and conduct research, specifically to
identify sources of pathogens, specific con-
tamination routes, and methods to “reduce,
9. Although pathogenic contamination is determined
scientifically, adulteration is a legal determination defined by
the U.S. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act.
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control or eliminate contamination of leafy
greens by human pathogens.”
Next, I analyze the implications of these recommenda-
tions for key regime actors at the regulatory, supply chain,
and farm levels to evaluate whether and to what extent
the lessons learned represent reflexive awareness of the
regime’s institutionalized non-knowledge of emergent
risks in the complex social–ecological system of romaine
agriculture.
Government response
In a statement on the outbreak, the FDA Commissioner
extoled “the use of modern tools to advance food safety”
(Gottlieb, 2018). His framing of the food safety problem,
and what to do about it, concisely captures FDA’s take-
away lessons:
While we know we can’t stop foodborne illness
completely, these numbers underscore the need for
us to do much more. We need to take additional
steps, and do it faster, to improve the safety of our
food supply. This is why we’ve focused on
developing and using advanced technologies and
science to enhance our efforts in preventing food
safety problems and improve our response time
when incidents occur. These are the tools that are
already helping the FDA and the CDC identify more
outbreaks of human illness, and trace them back to
food when food is the source.We need to invest even
more in these efforts, and in the tools to track and
trace contaminated food in the supply chain.
(emphasis added)
This statement adheres unreflexively to an assumption
of technoscientific deficit, evincing technocratic reasser-
tions to trust in the regime’s elite expertise as predicted
by both Dunn (2007) and McGoey (2012b). FDA’s goal is
more precise information on “contamination” gathered as
close to real time as possible. The favored response is to
“invest even more” in the same types of surveillance tools
already in use. No mention is made of possible need for
epistemic, organizational, or institutional adaptation
despite the potential to do so implied by the above-
referenced recommendation to increase local collabora-
tion and value “local in-depth knowledge.” This is a missed
opportunity (an action not taken). By investing in social
networks, the regime could invite more diverse perspec-
tives, which in turn might expand epistemic receptiveness
to risks and vulnerabilities outside its standard grid of
control—burdens that otherwise remain unrepresented
and uncounted externalities. Specifically, it is plausible
that incorporating the knowledge of practitioners familiar
with a given region’s climate, ecosystems, modes of pro-
duction, and cultural practices would help public health
investigators better recognize and account for the multi-
layered social and environmental relationships that con-
founded the Yuma investigation. In failing to center that
recommendation in its response, FDA eschewed one clear
route toward reflexive institutional reform.
Instead, the agency chose to double down on surveil-
lance technology likely to further institutionalize non-
knowledge of emergent and systemic risks arising from
localized agricultural conditions. Consider FDA’s invest-
ment in one technological advance predicted to play
a major role “in our fight against foodborne illness” (Got-
tlieb, 2018): whole genome sequencing (WGS). Outbreak
investigations rely on genetic subtyping to distinguish the
pathogens responsible from nonrelated cases (Ronholm et
al., 2016). Compared to older technologies, “WGS is fast
and cheap and produces subtyping and phylogenetic res-
olution on a scale that was never before achievable” (Ron-
holm et al., 2016). CDC describes WGS as a tool to
determine a “unique DNA fingerprint,” which investiga-
tors can use to piece together the events of an outbreak
and thus “solve” it (CDC, 2016). CDC and FDA are collab-
orating to expand and standardize WGS capacity in micro-
biological laboratories (Allard et al., 2016; Ronholm et al.,
2016).
FDA highlights two regulatory uses of WGS. First, WGS
can link pathogens found in food products or facilities
with pathogens isolated from victims of foodborne illness
by matching the “DNA fingerprints.” Second, the “most
promising and far reaching” application of WGS is to trace
the history of pathogenic contamination by “pairing
a foodborne pathogen’s genomic information with its geo-
graphic location and applying the principles of evolution-
ary biology to determine the relatedness of the
pathogens” (FDA, 2018d). Because microbes steadily accu-
mulate mutations over time, the degree of DNA difference
between two isolates can tell investigators how recently
they shared a common ancestor (Ronholm et al., 2016).
When paired with the FDA’s pathogen database, Genome-
Trakr—which includes genetic information along with the
date and source of the isolate—WGS “enables effective
monitoring of foodborne pathogens across the United
States and potentially across the globe” (Allard et al.,
2016). WGS thus represents, for FDA, a potent centralized
tool for surveillance, regulation, and, ultimately, control.
However, it is difficult to see how the extra genetic
information WGS offers would have changed the outcome
of the Yuma investigation or how future expansion of
WGS will address ignorance of the underlying social–eco-
logical conditions that make food unsafe in specific places.
No matter how advanced the test, the result is only as
useful as the samples obtained to test. It is unclear how
better testing would resolve one of the primary hurdles
for the environmental assessment: The Yuma agricultural
environment, and traces of the outbreak strain it may have
harbored, had already moved on from the conditions that
gave rise to the outbreak. The failure to produce a satisfac-
tory culprit for the outbreak did not stem from laborato-
ries but rather from the investigation team’s inability to
make sense of a complex, heterogeneous, and rapidly
changing production environment. The agency seems to
have formulated the problem to fit the solution rather
than the other way around. FDA’s fixation with centralized
surveillance technologies such as WGS not only distracts
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from efforts to cultivate “local in-depth knowledge” of the
production environments it is charged to oversee but
forces the regime to ask about the pathogen itself rather
than about the social–ecological conditions that allow it
to be dangerous.
Retail industry response
The retail industry, meanwhile, leveraged FDA’s techno-
cratic endorsement of surveillance tools to justify shifting
responsibility (and thus blame) toward growers and ship-
pers. On September 24, 2018—a week before FDA released
its final environmental assessment report—Walmart
announced that all of its leafy greens suppliers would
henceforth adhere to a new food traceability initiative
(Redfield et al., 2018). Based on blockchain technology,
the initiative “will increase transparency in the food sys-
tem,” the letter stated, further specifying that, “All fresh
leafy greens suppliers are expected to be able to trace their
products back to farm(s) (by production lot) in seconds –
not days” (Redfield et al., 2018). In this letter, Walmart
revealed the powerful role the retail sector plays in the
food safety regime. Through the pseudo-vertically inte-
grated system of supply chain management (Busch,
2007), retailers wield tremendous control over their sup-
pliers and intermediary handlers. In a move that parallels
FDA’s insistence on advanced surveillance technologies,
Walmart insisted that requiring advanced traceability tech-
nologies would resolve foodborne danger:
This change means that the information gathered by
these suppliers will be open and accessible through
technology that offers real-time, end-to-end
traceability from farm to table. (Smith, 2018)
The letter and accompanying promotional materials
prominently cited a partnership with IBM crypto-experts
and the soon-to-be-realized digitization of agriculture,
framing the problem as an outdated system in need of
high-tech modernization. Notably, Walmart also claimed
that blockchain empowers the individual consumer: “In
the future,” said Frank Yiannas, then VP of food safety
at Walmart, “using the technology we’re requiring, a cus-
tomer could potentially scan a bag of salad and know with
certainty where it came from” (Smith, 2018). The rhetoric
explicitly tied traceability to transparency and then to
trust. Blockchain technology keeps records “open to users”
and also “makes falsifying information very difficult”: “The
information is out in the open creating greater trans-
parency . . .With increased accessibility comes more accu-
racy and trust” (Smith, 2018). Although FDA promoted
WGS technology to render pathogens legible to the state,
the retail sector promoted blockchain technology to ren-
der suppliers legible to buyers.
The interrelationship between these two surveillance
initiatives was further institutionalized through the
December 2018 appointment of Yiannas to the FDA as
Deputy Commissioner for Food Policy and Response. In
early 2019, Yiannas and the FDA Commissioner’s office
announced “a new era of smarter food safety” in which
“all those involved in making food products available to
consumers must walk in lockstep on this path” to create
“a more digital, traceable, and safer system” (Sharpless and
Yiannas, 2019). In remarks before the International Asso-
ciation for Food Protection several months later, Yiannas
promoted blockchain technology and predictive analytics,
stating, “We want consumers to have the confidence in the
safety of new and existing products that a transparent,
data-driven food safety system can provide” (Yiannas,
2019).
Despite these glossy promises, and for all the talk of
speed, new surveillance tools cannot unilaterally trans-
mute a fundamentally reactive method into a preventive
strategy. CDC and FDA identified the outbreak just 6 days
before the Yuma harvest ended; due to inherent lag time
from harvest to table to symptoms, nearly all the contam-
inated romaine had already reached consumers. Brightly
illuminating the supply chain could have yielded limited
improvements in warning the public and recalling prod-
uct, but it could not have addressed the multilayered fac-
tors that led to the outbreak and confounded the
investigation. Blockchain-enabled traceability once again
focuses on “lines,” even though a “web” more closely re-
sembles the Yuma scenario: Romaine lettuce from multi-
ple farms selling through separate supply chains was all
contaminated simultaneously. Rendering each link in the
chain of transactions “transparent” also narrowly isolates
the responsibility of individual growers and shippers. This
forces the regime to ask, “What did individual firms fail to
do?” precluding the question of whether their level of
operational agency is commensurate with their level of
operational risk. Hence, the retail industry seems to have
formulated the problem to fit their expectations about
who should be responsible for fixing it, even though
landscape-level risks extend beyond the bounds of farm-
level authority. In this way, the regime’s institutionalized
non-knowledge preserves an epistemic “safe” space within
which technocratic assertions and blame avoidance strat-
egies coproduce one another, together reinforcing the
retail sector’s power.
Leafy greens industry response
In late May 2018, the leafy greens industry organized the
Leafy Greens Food Safety Task Force (2018) to respond to
the vulnerabilities exposed by the outbreak. Representing
those directly responsible for growing and handling
romaine lettuce, the task force diverged from the regula-
tory emphasis on surveillance and traceability. “[W]e’re
going to focus heavily on practices that are going to pre-
vent illnesses in the future,” said Scott Horsfall, CEO of
LGMA and a steering committee member for the task
force, “because traceback and the investigation often just
takes a long time, so far better if we prevent the patho-
gens from ever getting in the marketplace” (Nickle,
2018a). The final recommendations issued by the task
force reflect that intention. Of the 26 recommendations,
only 4 involved traceability and 2 surveillance, while 5
aimed to enhance communications and 15 to improve
best practices to prevent contamination (Leafy Greens
Food Safety Task Force, 2018).
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Specifically, the task force aimed to toughen LGMA
production standards to protect against the hazards posed
by CAFOs, extreme weather events, and waterborne con-
tamination. Here, the growers missed an opportunity to
challenge the distribution of responsibility (and costs)
within the regime. They positioned the problem at the
farm level, implicitly accepting the regulatory presump-
tion that the burden of responsibility lies with individual
growers. Another task force leader, quoted in the industry
periodical The Packer, said, “We need to do some really
robust hazard assessments at every individual site because
every individual site is different and every individual site is
going to require different levels of control and different
mitigations” (Nickle, 2018b). The article further reported
that the task force “is now developing tools to help
growers conduct those assessments—which consider
topography, weather, management practices of nearby op-
erations and other relevant factors.” Although the task
force framed this effort as empowering growers to prevent
pathogenic contamination, the recommendations also
imply that growers needed to do more because farm-
level efforts to date had been inadequate.
This stance dovetails with a common consumer advo-
cacy narrative that frames food safety as a function of
grower diligence and outbreaks as the result of industry
negligence. For example, in late 2018, Consumer Reports
published an article titled, “Grower Steps to Keep
Romaine Safe May Not Be Enough.” Although food scares
catalyze growers to take more precaution, the article con-
cluded, “how long that will last . . . is anyone’s guess”
because “after things get quiet for a while, everything gets
lax again” (Hirsch, 2019). The industry itself also ques-
tioned growers’ commitment to food safety. The article
quotes the chief science and technology officer for the
powerful Produce Marketing Association: “It shouldn’t
take outbreaks like these to make produce companies
be more diligent . . . there needs to be a corporate culture
that takes them seriously.” The same argument for a “food
safety culture” to instill diligence and commitment has
circulated among industry elites for over a decade (Baur
et al., 2017). However, growers are already under signifi-
cant pressure to prioritize food safety; if an outbreak oc-
curs, they face steep financial and reputational losses,
lawsuits from victims, and even criminal charges (Baur
et al., 2017). Given these existential threats to livelihood,
it is unclear how much additional diligence and commit-
ment can be instilled in growers.
The task force’s interest in understanding the interde-
pendency of environmental conditions represents a recog-
nition of systemic biophysical vulnerabilities that is not
evident in regulatory or retail responses. Yet growers’
capacity to act on that expanded awareness is limited to
the boundaries of their farms—it does not extend to off-
farm sources of hazards or to risk multipliers after they
ship the lettuce. Moreover, growers must still conform to
an economic “higher loyalty” and maintain high produc-
tivity. Ratcheting up preventive practices at the farm level
thus articulates tightly with surveillance and traceability.
Each response turns a blind eye to disparities between
sources of foodborne risk and assignment of
responsibility. Together they divert the regime from recog-
nizing and adapting to structural vulnerabilities at the
food system level. Non-knowledge institutionalized within
the food safety regime thus precludes coordinated actions
that might, for example, seek to curb the pathogenicity of
CAFOs or cap the potential for contamination to spread by
restricting romaine harvests to small batches strictly
sequestered from one another. In both the epistemic and
strategic sense, the food safety regime cannot know that
overflow might be endemic to its control-oriented design.
Paths not taken
Recounting the outbreak investigation and response
through an agnotology lens revealed internal inconsisten-
cies and missed opportunities that together suggest that
institutionalized non-knowledge plays a critical role in
both the continued occurrence of outbreaks and the re-
gime’s incapacity to adapt to the crisis.What remains to be
seen, however, is whether alternative normative and epis-
temological commitments might plausibly trigger reflex-
ive reform in the food safety regime. The methodological
obstacles to this section are substantial. As Gross and
McGoey (2015, p. 7) asked, “How can a researcher know
what an individual or an observed group of actors do not
know?” To tether my analysis to empirical roots, I tack
a course that hues to published critiques of the outbreak
investigation, response, and the food safety regime’s gen-
eral control strategy. Although the results are no less spec-
ulative—an inevitability when dealing with the
hypothetical—they do represent alternative courses of
inquiry and action that external observers believed would
be worthwhile. This is neither an exhaustive nor a prescrip-
tive analysis. Instead, these hypothetical examples of what
and how to “know differently” demonstrate the contin-
gency of institutionalized non-knowledge exposed by the
Yuma outbreak.
Critiques of the outbreak investigation and
response
As the investigation haltingly proceeded, many romaine
lettuce producers—especially growers from other regions
whose romaine products were also circulating in the mar-
ketplace as the outbreak unfolded—expressed frustration
with what they saw as FDA’s unjust commodity-wide mor-
atorium. CAFF and The Farmers Guild (2018), an organi-
zation representing family farms, blogged, “While romaine
grown by small California farms selling directly to consu-
mers (at venues such as farmers markets) could in no way
be implicated, they nonetheless take the hit.” Growers in
this position felt the warnings against romaine punished
all growers, irrespective of their location or “their auton-
omy from the vast supply chain currently under in-
vestigation.” This sense of unfair assignment of blame
extended even to those growers whose products were
implicated. Consider the single farm that was publicly
named in the investigation. As the Arizona Republic
reported,
Health officials were able to link Harrison [Farms] to
the eight cases [of E. coli poisoning among Alaska
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inmates] because the farm used an intermediate
shipper to send whole heads of lettuce to the prison.
Lettuce from other farms was mixed together by
shippers, making it impossible for investigators to
determine where it came from. (Anglen, 2018b)
Only the lone farm unlucky enough to supply a shipper
that did not mix romaine from different farms was singled
out, a result that some commentators attributed to polit-
ical expedience rather than due process, saying, “FDA was
under pressure to name someone” (Anglen, 2018a).
Underlying the sense of unfairness expressed in these ex-
amples is an implicit belief that the investigators failed to
adequately identify who actually bore responsibility for
the outbreak. In both cases, the commentators suggest
that the corporate industrial lettuce system deserved
scrutiny.
The environmental assessment’s fixation with contam-
inated canal water as the singular causal suspect also
met with criticism. The Leafy Greens Task Force (2018)
advanced a theory proposing that “unusual weather”
may have created what one participant called a “perfect
storm of conditions” (personal communication, October
1, 2018). First, a hard freeze hit, which may have caused
“epidermal peel” in the delicate romaine and “allowed
the pathogen to enter the leaves.” Shortly afterward,
strong winds blew across the region, potentially carrying
E. coli from feedlots to the fields on dust particles. A
subsequent heavy rain could have spread the contamina-
tion even further. “So that’s the other idea,” this task
force participant noted, “that there was just a combina-
tion of anomalous problems” (personal communication,
October 1, 2018). This is the closest that any member of
the food safety regime came to acknowledging the pos-
sibility of an emergent risk produced not from an iso-
lated causal agent but rather from the chaotic, emergent,
and interacting effects of a dangerously vulnerable farm
environment. Attorney Bill Marler, a prominent litigator
for victims of foodborne illness, made the case more
bluntly:
[T]he undeterred insistence of growing, processing,
sourcing, and selling romaine lettuce from a region
repeatedly plagued by STEC contamination and
subsequent outbreaks is a considerably reckless
activity. (Marler, 2019, emphasis added)
Taking the point to its extreme, Marler argues that it
should be considered “‘reckless misconduct’ to grow, pro-
cess and sell romaine lettuce” because “the risk of envi-
ronmental contamination was in fact a well-known and
long-standing risk” at a regional level (Marler, 2019). In
other words, the risk is of a type that is beyond the control
of any individual grower, and therefore, trust is no longer
merited.
Agroecological alternatives to control
Both critiques of the investigation hint at an underlying
frustration with the basic framework used to produce
knowledge about both who and what caused the
outbreak. The food safety regime presumes that control
is the only strategy. All frameworks have limitations, but
those limitations rise to the level of institutionalized
non-knowledge in cases where experts do not acknowl-
edge the possibility of normative and epistemic alterna-
tives. To illustrate the contingency of the control strategy,
I briefly outline several alternative ways in which a per-
spective grounded in agroecology—a participatory sci-
ence that seeks to enhance sustainable agriculture
through deep ecological knowledge of the interrelation-
ships between a farm and its environment (Rosset and
Altieri, 2017; Vandermeer and Perfecto, 2017)—might
seek to understand and manage the dangers posed by
foodborne pathogens. Specifically, the regime’s seek-and-
destroy approach to achieving control contrasts sharply
against the resilient adaptation approach advanced by
agroecology, which seeks to bolster the “immune system”
of agriculture by enhancing biodiversity (Rosset and Al-
tieri, 2017, p. 20).
This perspective appeared early in the course of food
safety reform for U.S. vegetable agriculture, when the
National Sustainable Agriculture Coalition advanced the
following argument in counterpoint to a perceived “war
on nature” (Stuart, 2008) embedded in the LGMA and
nascent FSMA:
Agriculture is a human endeavor based on biological
processes, and nature cannot be eliminated from
the equation. Food safety will not be achieved simply
by monitoring and killing bacteria—it must come
from a food system that values human relationships
and environmental stewardship. (NSAC, 2009)
Farmers walk an ever-shifting line between adaptation
to the environment as given and intervention to make that
environment more congenial to their vision of farming
(Henke, 2008, p. 114). Ironically, although industrial agri-
culture is premised on remaking hydrological regimes,
soils, and ecosystems to resemble a factory, the food safety
regime appears to accept as given the dangerous patho-
genicity and immunodeficiency of the industrial farm
landscape. An agroecological perspective, in contrast, ac-
knowledges anthropogenic effects on the evolution of the
very pathogens that the food safety regime battles against.
Wallace (2016), for example, documents the coevolution
between corporate-industrial chicken farms and deadly
viruses. Yet, rather than recognize coevolution, Russell ob-
serves (2003, pp. 85–102):
We have largely ignored . . . the impact of ecological
changes and public health measures on the
constitutions of other species. By changing the
environments in which organisms live, we have
changed the selective regimes in which they evolve.
In some cases, the resulting evolution has forced
humans to interact with versions of those species in
very different ways.
What the food safety regime fails to imagine, and thus
fails to know and act upon, are the consequences that
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result from the perpetually unresolved “tension inherent
in applying food-safety principles developed for the con-
trolled industrial context of factories to the dynamic eco-
logical matrix of farm fields” (Karp et al., 2015a). Stuart
(2008) argues that control-based food safety might
“actually serve to increase risks to human health” by pro-
ducing sterile environments that are more favorable to
pathogenic bacteria.
From this perspective, treating fields as factories also
obscures social–ecological feedback dynamics and fore-
closes possibilities to cultivate resilience. Recent research
indicates that ecologically based farm management can
encourage ecosystem services that mitigate risks from
human pathogens in farm soil (Jones et al., 2019) and
wildlife (Karp et al., 2015b), examples of emerging knowl-
edge on how to enhance agroecological resilience to path-
ogenic dangers (Stuart and Worosz, 2011; Olimpi et al.,
2019). More radically, a framework aimed at resilient adap-
tation might mean the regime should loosen its grip on
control. Some argue that tolerating periodic, low-grade
illness is necessary in order to mitigate the severity and
scale of more extreme outbreaks:
One could make a case that, just as we want some
level of exposure to infectious agents—or simulated
exposures such as vaccination—to maintain the
resilience of our immune system, so we may want to
tolerate the smaller disease outbreaks that come
with a more decentralized agrifood system . . .In this
sense at least, a little bit of food poisoning is
probably a good thing. It helps us to keep up our
personal immunity as well as our capacity to
respond to outbreaks, and serves the crucial role of
reminding all participants in this shortened, more
visible, food chain about the inherent risks of eating
our environments. (Waltner-Toews, 1996)
Notably, this statement consciously takes both an
epistemic and normative stance, embracing a framework
that reimagines safety as a function of resilience and
adaptability, with the goal “not to eliminate the danger,
but to manage it” (Delind and Howard, 2008). The food
safety governance regime’s core epistemological
assumption is that science and technology can defend
society against whatever dangers nature throws at it,
a stance that also obviates deliberation about the dis-
tribution of burdens and benefits. In contrast, an agroe-
cological perspective assumes that adaptive
management with nature can diffuse danger into
“tolerable” background perturbations. Moreover, the
question of what foodborne risks are tolerable, and who
has to do the tolerating when and where on behalf of
whom, is foregrounded for consideration.
I present these agroecologically inspired perspectives
not as prescriptions but as plausible examples of an alter-
native strategy for knowing and acting upon foodborne
dangers that is reflexively adaptive at the social–ecological
system level. My point is that the regime has a choice in
which values and epistemologies to embrace, and that
choice has real consequences for the nature, magnitude,
and distribution of benefits and burdens in food systems—
including whether and to what extent the regime can
accept change now in order to transition toward a more
sustainable future. Ultimately, this is a societal choice of
“how to live democratically and at peace with the knowl-
edge that our societies are inevitably ‘at risk’” (Jasanoff,
2003), but the regime has organized its ignorance so as to
bury presumed answers to this question deep within its
technical institutions.
Discussion
My analysis of the Yuma outbreak investigation, official
response, and comparison to plausible paths not taken
demonstrates the ways in which the food safety regime
produces positive knowledge of some kinds of danger
(proximate and amenable to technical “fixes”) while insti-
tutionalizing non-knowledge of other kinds (systemic
and requiring structural change). Critically, this knowl-
edge–ignorance duality is coproduced with a strategy
of reform that reinforces the regime’s authority and
power across scientific, policy, and management do-
mains, albeit at the cost of precluding possibilities for
reflexive adaptation.
Institutionalized non-knowledge
At the scientific level, the regime reductively equates dan-
ger with the presence of discrete hazards. Investigation,
surveillance, and traceback protocols are designed to pin-
point isolated causes—such as canal water, animal feces, or
human hands—that might endanger leafy greens. They
further presume that isolated hazards cause discrete con-
tamination events, which in turn propagate stepwise
along a linear chain of causality following the supply
chain. The regime hinges its claim to control on its capac-
ity to identify and sever the chain of contamination as
close to the first link as possible. In so doing, the regime
embraces a reactive, after-the-fact form of action that
seeks to patch individual leaks rather than a preventive,
systemic approach to remedy vulnerabilities across the
agricultural landscape.
At the policy level, the regime pursues centralized, top-
down control over leafy greens agriculture, evidenced by
the emphasis on surveillance and traceability technologies
among both public and private regulators. The locus of
power in the regime is maintained by enforcing
a “regulatory chain” that parallels the supply chain, and
in principle, the chain of contamination (Abbott et al.,
2017; Havinga and Verbruggen, 2017). Regimes based
on regulatory chains entangle numerous intermediaries,
such as auditors and technical consultants, who also have
a vested interest in preserving the status quo (Lytton and
McAllister, 2014; Lytton, 2017). In this hierarchical system,
trust is presumed to derive from the capacity for “higher”
levels within the regime to see precisely what actors at
“lower” levels (i.e., on the farm) are doing. Overlooked by
this presumption is the need for the most abstracted le-
vels of governance regimes to learn from the most
grounded, a prerequisite process for adaptively cultivating






enta.2021.00041.pdf by guest on 21 M
arch 2021
social–ecological resilience to crisis-level outbreaks from
the ground up.10
Finally, at the management level, the regime assumes
a neoliberal model of human agency that individualizes
responsibility and accountability, evidenced by the re-
gime’s fixation with refining farm-level best practices and
asserting food safety culture irrespective of the scale of
risk. The “individualization of responsibility” for food
safety at the company level parallels that which sociolo-
gists have long critiqued among individual consumers,
who are encouraged to accept responsibility for structural
failings in the modern industrial economy—such as envi-
ronmental degradation or exploitation of workers—over
which they have little direct power (Maniates, 2001; Szasz,
2007). The current food safety governance regime likewise
places responsibility for structural failings of the entire
agrifood system onto individual leafy greens growers,
obscuring the role that political economic forces play in
shaping and distributing systemic risks.
The strategic value of non-knowledge
The U.S. food safety regime is hypervigilant in identifying
outbreaks and increasingly effective at linking them to
their proximate cause, for example, romaine lettuce. But
the regime’s dominant epistemology obscures the politi-
cal economic connection between knowing what causes
illness and who causes illness. The sophisticated institu-
tional arrangements to coordinate technical analysis of
aggregated, standardized, and decontextualized data en
masse distance the technical work from the exercise of
power. Yet tracing and predicting contamination also im-
plicates real people and real production environments. At
stake, in other words, is not just the epistemological status
of foodborne disease outbreaks—the ways in which knowl-
edge (and non-knowledge) about outbreaks and their
causes is produced—but also the locus of power in terms
of who can “reveal,” that is, represent or speak for, public
danger.
I have argued that the locus of power maintained
through epistemic and regulatory standards intended to
control human pathogenic risks is continually reproduced
not only through positive identification of discrete ha-
zards but also through strategic omission of emergent
hazards and the ways in which the industrial agrifood
environment may itself be dangerous and risky. The food
safety regime’s agnosticism toward systemic risks—which
expose large-scale industrial leafy greens agriculture to
periodic invasion by deadly pathogens—is strikingly con-
venient for the expert elites who control the produce
safety regime. The situation is reminiscent of what
McGoey (2007) termed the “will to ignorance” evident
in the circular faith that audit-based bureaucracy places
in its own authority:
[A]udits are remarkably invulnerable to their own
failure, and that, in the rare instance when attention
does occasionally turn to the question of process,
either individuals, or the specifics of individual
audits, are blamed instead of the system of auditing
itself.
Discrete contamination hazards can be “controlled”—
and public trust in the food supply upheld—without fun-
damentally restructuring the centralized, simplified, and
corporate-owned agrifood system.
Institutionalized non-knowledge impedes reflexive
adaptation
That “sewer-state” mentality (Dunn, 2007), however,
comes at a cost: “By dictating, if not manufacturing, the
dangers to be controlled, the state obscures the fact that
danger and diversity are essential elements of life . . . Far
from eliminating all risk, it keeps us desperate and in
perpetual need of protection” (DeLind and Howard,
2008). DuPuis (2015, pp. 112–123) contends that, to
escape this “sanitary treadmill,” it would be healthier,
more equitable, and more sustainable to openly accept
that the safety–danger boundary is “constructed through
a discursive political process.” Acknowledging the futility
of chasing perfect control over an agricultural environ-
ment that is clearly capable of surprising us would mean
adopting a reflexive stance toward systemic risk (Beck et
al., 2003). Reflexivity entails restructuring and reprioritiz-
ing the food safety regime to internalize and more justly
distribute negative consequences of its self-perpetuating
vulnerability to outbreaks of foodborne infectious disease
(Stuart and Worosz, 2011). Reflexive adaptation would
need to squarely address the intersecting political eco-
nomic and biophysical conditions that generate systemic
immunodeficiency. A food safety governance regime adap-
tively responsive to systemic risks would acknowledge the
divergence between capital accumulation and public
health, as well as the deeply problematic linkages among
farmland consolidation, agroecosystem homogenization,
coevolving pathogens, and the risk-magnifying effects of
a centralized industrial food system. Yet this complexity is
precisely what the modern food safety governance regime
fails to know.
Limitations and next steps
In focusing on authoritative claims made by the food
safety regime and its constituent groups, the scope of
my analysis is limited to formal public documents. I inten-
tionally restricted my data set to those public documents
that the regime chose to make freely accessible in order to
examine the regime’s preferred narrative. Future research
using these methods might consider utilizing the U.S.
Freedom of Information Act—or comparable transparency
laws in other jurisdictions—to access “backstage” docu-
ments that are legally public but not necessarily made
publicly accessible. Other sources of evidence, such as
social media posts or interviews, could provide further
insight into the informal or nonpublic aspects of
10. There is a vast literature on institutional learning, but
see especially Ansell (2011: 104–125) on recursive learning. On
the importance of learning for sustainable agricultural
adaptation, see Darnhofer et al. (2010) and Duru et al. (2015).
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epistemic culture—the internal norms governing what
questions shall be asked, how they shall be answered, and
what shall be done about it—within different facets of the
regime.
I concluded that the regime remains formally unaware
of certain limitations to its knowledge, particularly emer-
gent vulnerabilities of social–ecological systems, at the
organizational level. An important future research ques-
tion is whether and in what ways experts and decision
makers acting within the regime (as growers, buyers, or
regulators) conform to the same contours of ignorance at
the individual level. Studying the interplay between orga-
nization and individual and between external (public, for-
mal) and internal (private, informal) non-knowledge could
elucidate the ways in which non-knowledge becomes
institutionalized in the first place, as well as suggesting
mechanisms through which such organized ignorance
might be consciously reflected upon and even decon-
structed. In terms of practical intervention, however, orga-
nizational culture, professional norms, or standards of
evidence-based analysis do not emerge nor are they main-
tained in isolation; rather, they interact with structural
constraints shaped by factors including rules, markets, and
liability. Future research might therefore also address the
degrees of freedom to reflect on and adapt to organized
non-knowledge afforded to regime members within these
intersecting structural constraints.
Conclusion
In Risk Society, Ulrich Beck (1992) famously argued that
modern society is organized around one central problem:
how to deal with the systemic risks unleashed by indus-
trial capitalism’s global manipulation of social–ecological
systems. Perhaps nowhere else are these projected risks
more unavoidably manifest than in agrifood systems,
where harmful “boomerang effects” of industrial agricul-
ture are readily observable across health, economic, eco-
logical, climatic, geopolitical, and cultural dimensions. Yet,
like the outbreak investigation process in my case, the
governing regimes responsible for understanding and re-
sponding to this complex risk landscape in agrifood sys-
tems may be woefully ill-equipped with the epistemic and
normative tools to meaningfully grapple with the inter-
sectional problems before them. Ansell and Baur (2018)
suggest that regimes caught in this situation tend toward
instability, leading either to breakdown and dissolution or
to a degree of “mission drift” so severe that they lose their
purpose.
This article is motivated by a desire to understand and
thereby better stabilize the regimes that govern the health
and sustainability of our agrifood systems. To make gov-
erning regimes more stable, I suggest, takes not just
increased technical capacity (to overcome deficit) or stron-
ger mechanisms of accountability (to deter blame avoid-
ance) but heightened cultural and cognitive adaptability
to navigate the limits of their own structured ignorance.
I am not arguing that ignorance merely constitutes
“undone” science that should be completed. To do so
would risk falling into the technocratic hubris against
which Stuart and Worosz (2011) warn. Instead, I cleave
to the theory that the boundaries between the normative
categories of safe and unsafe are inextricably entwined
with those between the epistemological categories of the
known and the not-known. This insight suggests that in
place of control, it might be healthier, in all senses of the
word, to collectively accept “positive non-knowledge,”
“where the limits and the borders of knowing are inten-
tionally taken into account for acting or planning” (Gross
and Bleicher, 2013). Accessibly accounting for non-
knowledge may facilitate public deliberation, as Jasanoff
(2003) argues in her advocacy for “technologies of
humility,” and can reduce paralysis to the extent that soci-
ety is willing to accept action even in the absence of
calculable, and thus controllable, futures (Gross, 2016).
Another way of framing the point is to draw on adap-
tive capacity theory, within which strict control and cer-
tainty are eschewed in favor of flexibility, learning, and
resilience (Darnhofer et al., 2010; Duru et al., 2015). In
this context, systemic reflexivity is a necessary condition
for initiating sustainability transitions; applying agnotol-
ogy to complex environmental governance systems reveals
the barriers to reflexivity encoded in organized non-
knowledge. Specifically, the inertia of long-standing cul-
tural and cognitive structures for understanding and re-
sponding to problems may prevent even acute social–
ecological crises from catalyzing adaptation and transi-
tion, especially in cases where those structures are largely
taken for granted. Significant theoretical development
and empirical analysis are needed to thoroughly concep-
tualize and examine the role that positive non-knowledge
might play in critically evaluating those limitations and
opening up food systems to the degree of sustainable and
just transformation increasingly recommended (Hinrichs,
2014; Bui et al., 2016; Maye and Duncan, 2017; Lamine et
al., 2019). At the very least, positive non-knowledge re-
quires the imaginative capacity to envision a broader
range of what might be possible, including challenging
dominant political economic formations such as the
highly centralized supply chain that funnels nearly all
salad greens through a handful or corporate suppliers.
This case reinforces the urgency of such work, and more
broadly the value of incorporating perspectives from the
field of ignorance studies (Gross and McGoey, 2015) into
interdisciplinary efforts to shift society–environment in-
teractions toward sustainability.
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